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'

WITIIDRAW AL FROM VIETNAM
Mr MANSF'IELD. Mr. President, I

have ·come across a column by Joseph C.
Harsch enlitled "How Fast?" havtn>: to
do with the situation in Vietnam and Lhe
practical and realistic difficulltes m
which the President of the United States
finds himself. The article reads. m part:
The-ro cnn be no clcnr or sure nnswer.

That is. to the question of withdrawal.
It !las to be a variable. It must dep('nd on
tile capaolt.y or tile so uth VieLnatn ann'd
forces to provide the necessary security for
the wit.hd!-.\Wal. And that certainly d oes mell.n
more time than either the Pres ident or the
"moratorltun" marchers would like to leave.
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Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this column and a very worthwhile editorial by Hedley Donovan, entitled "Winding Down the Wa.r on Our
Own " which explains realistically the
situS:tton in which the President and we
find ourselves in Vietnam, be printed in
the RECORD.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed In the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Chrl.stlan Science Monitor, Oct.
21, 19691
How FAsr?
(By Joseph c. Harsch)
WASHINGTON.-ln one sense the Issue between President Nixon and the peace demonstrators Is now narrow. Everybody (almost) wanta pes.ce. Everybody (almost)
agreee that American combe.t forces should
be withdrawn. Whe.t remains as e.n Issue
Is only the speed of the withdrawal.
It Mr. Nixon would even fix e. spectfic de.te,
much ot the opposition to him would <Usa.ppee.r. It he fixed an ee.rly de.te, most of It
would cUsa.ppee.r.

At thls point there e.re some very ree.l e.nd
eerlous military !e.ctors.
ABSTRACT THEORY

In &bstract theory It would be physically

possible to pull the entire he.l!-mllllon men
out In a month.
By com.ma.ndeering cruise liners from the
aea and pa.ssenger e.lr-llners from the sky a
mass ll!t In SO de.ys could be done.
Obviously, no sensible person would dream
of doing the withdrawal the.t we.y. The equipment could not be te.ken out e.t any such
pace. To lee.ve the equipment behind 1n a
crash withdrawal program would probably
amount, 1n etrect, to giving most of It, perhe.ps all, to the VIet Cong and North VIetnam forces.
The essential military point Is that a sudden withdre.wal could all too easily degenerate Into a fighting withdraw&!.
The present Nixon plan calls for the gradual withdrawal ot United Ste.tee combat
force&, leaving e.lr support, co=unlcatlons,
and supply until the le.st.
But lee.vlng perhe.ps a que.rter of a million
Americans ot those types 1n VIetnam without American Infantry protection could be
extremely dangerous. It would be possible
only 1! the South VIetnam Army oould be
relied upon to provide the necesse.ry security
tor the noncombat people.
POLITICAL CHAOS
And time Is an e88entlal element In the
ce.pe.clty of the South VIetnam Army to provide the.t protection. A eudden withdrawal
would almost certe.lnly mean political chaos
In Saigon tollowed by the breakup or the
South Vietnam e.rmed forces. The retreat
!rom the Ye.lu during the Koree.n we.r Is an
example ot what could all too easily happen
under such circumstances. Zenophon's fightIng retreat trom Asia Minor Is another. Mr.
Nixon, understandably, de.re not order the
kind or withdrawal program which could lead
to a Dunkirk.
So how tast can the withdrawal be managed without running the serious risk ot a
Dunkirk?
There can be no clear or sure answer. It
has to be a variable. It must depend on the
capac1ty or the South Vietnam armed !orces
to provide the necessary security for the
withdrawal. And that certainly does mean
more time than either the President or the
·•morator~um·· marchers would like to leave.
THEORETICAL MERIT

The moratorium deadline Is the end of
1970 Mr. Nixon would be delighted to get
every last American out ot VIetnam by November of 1970. Such a deadline would be
manna from heaven tor every Republican
running for reelection that month.

October 2'!. 1. Jfi!l
1

would do better to marvel at the stahllit'
and patience or the nation they are prl Yl leged to lead, rather than purse llps and
wonder how Ha.nol Is reacting our stuclent'
today.
Once we start thinking or American anitudes about Vietnam as Important for tl1elr
own sake, not as mirror messages being
fiashed from here to Hanoi and back. sHernl
things tall Into place.
We should stop expecting anything out of
the Paris peace talks. In recent months the
North Vietnamese have not budged one centimeter. (How could a Harvard demonstra tion make them more Intransigent?) We
should proceed on the assumption there will
be no formal settlement with the North. We
should of course keep our delegation In
Paris, talking and listening. There are some
things the U .S. government should be saying
WINDING DOWN THE WAR ON Qua OWN
to America Itself, to South Vietnam and to
Southeast Asia that might conceivably In(By Hedley Donovan)
Richard Nixon has said he does not pro- terest Hanoi. It so. fine; but 1! not, our
pose to be the first American President to policies must proceed tor our own good
reasons.
Jose a war. He might, however, It he and we
We should be withdrawing our troops , In
e.re lucky, become the third President to settle tor a tie. The others were James Madison Hubert Humphrey·s good word, "systemati(War ot 1812) and Dwight Eisenhower (Ko- cally." This means a fairly firm presidential
rea), perfectly respectable company tor any timetable, which no doubt exists. The President Is right to resist any public promise to
President to keep.
The President waa strangely tense and be totally out of Vietnam by some early.
date, despite the 57 "'o Gallup Poll tn
rigid In hls advance comments on the Viet- exact
nam Moratorium (he would "under no cir- favor or Senator Ooodell"s resolution comcumstances .. . be affected
whatever"). mitting us to be gone by the end of 1970. But
Nixon should conquer the press-conferMany of the Oct. 15 people, to be sure, Mr.
ence refiex that leads him to try to outbid
would not be appeased by anything Mr. the Goodells and Clark Clll!ords, suggesting
Nixon could do, short or Immediate and total withdrawal. Yet Mr. Nlxon·s VIetnam that such critics Interfere with his hopes of
getting out sooner. We have little enough
policy Is a great deal more realistic and hu- bargaining power vls-a-vls Hanoi since It Is
mane than he Is getting credit for, In part so
clear that we e.re disengaging, and since it
because he and his admlnlstratlon explain Is unthinkable that we could re-escnlntc.
It so badly, In part because criticism ot the short of some monstrous provocation.
war he.s reached so high an emotional pitch.
The American public, we would guess. Is
The President has In fact begun a uni- wllllng to support 12 to 18, maybe at most 24 .
lateral withdrawal of the bulk of American more months of mllltary effort In Vletne.m If
forces !rom Vietnam.
withdrawals are In progress and If casualties
The President has In fact reined In his and costs are decllnlng steadily.
commanders so closely that In some areas
The President has already ordered withof VIetnam a kind or unllnteral cease-fire drawals of 60,000 men trom our peak strength
prevails.
of 540,000, a.nd there are hints that he may
What else should he do? Nlxon·s acts o! announce another cut before the end or the
de-escalation go further than many VIetnam year. Civilians need not be too diffident
dissenters were demanding only a year ago. about entering the numbers game, for It Is
But the point Is, of course, that now is a essentially an appraisal of American sentiyear later. LIFE believes there Is more the ment rather than a technical mllltary judgPresident could be doing to turther the pros- ment. For our part, we hope that the Presipecta tor a tolerable outcome In Vietnam: dent Is aiming at a torce no bigger than 150.In his dealings with hls own men In Wash- 000 by mld-1971. (We st111 keep 50.000 men tu
Ington, with the Saigon government, with Korea. 16 years after the truce.) Whether
Hanoi, and In his dealings with U.S. opinion, there should be such a rear guard at all
which Is his most critical negotiation of all. (chlefiy In logistics and air support) could
To start with, we propose that the policy- Indeed be a subject of negotiation. and Is
makers of the Nixon administration begin not a point to be given away for nothing.
treating with U.S. opinion in its own right,
The hope Is that as we withdraw the Sou th
not as though Its chief Importance lay In Vel tnamese army will be Improving fast
the Interpretation Hanoi places upon lt. Mr. enough to take over more and more of the
Nixon, much to his credit, ha.s never since fighting and the South Vietnamese governhis Inauguration put public blame on the ment will be broadening Its support. It may
Johnson administration tor his Vietnam bur- just work. We should press Thleu and Ky on
den. But he has allowed his administration bureaucratic corruption, land reform and
sometimes to sound like the dug-In L.B.J., polltlcal Imprisonments.
equating the VIetnam dissent with aid and
We should continue shifting the U .S milicomtort to the enemy.
tary effort away from the "maximum presIt Is a profound question how-and sure" concept toward population prot ecllon
whether-a democracy should conduct a war and training ot the ARVN. The new policy
with only, say 60 % ot public opinion In sup- has contributed to a marked reduction of
port. Our Constitution specifies no fewer American casualties, now at their lowest level
than nine matters, none as serious as a war, In nearly three years. Secretary Rogers thinks
which require a two-thirds vote for congres- the enemy, however unyielding at Paris. has
sional approval. When we are In a war which carried out a "very significant•• de-escalation
has never had explicit congressional sanc- In the field, cutting down troop Infiltration
tion, and never even been legally ""declared." from the North by as much as two thirds
being fought In good part by draftees (chosen Mllltary brass In Washington and Saigon
by a fantastically cnprlclous system). a war continue the somewhat ritualistic warning
which many (LIFE Included) have thought that this may just be the lull before a n<'w
Important to win but almost nobody has offensive. Mr. Nixon should decide whether
ever claimed was Imperative, and when this he agrees with his Secretary of State. and
war has dragged on lnconclusl vely for years, If so, perhaps hasten his next troop withthe wonder Is not that there Is protest but drawal announcement.
that there Is so much wllllngness to serve
The President has promised a major Vietand sacrifice. Mr. Nixon. and Mr Agnew, too, nam speech !or November 3. It Is none too

But a November, 1970, deadline would
probably not be safe.
What then could Mr. Nixon do with safety
to American troops beyond what he has already done?
One useful Idea. le provided by Human
Events, the right-wing lntormatlon sheet. It
sa.ys he should send home all conscripts ar•d
use only volunteers In Vlel,nam. The Idea haa
great theoretical merit, and would be welcome In many quarters at the Pentagon, l!
enough time Is provided. It would probably
te.ke most of a year to do It safely. You can't
risk the breakup or mixed volunteer-conscript unlts at the front.
Another measure would be to announce
a deadline tor final withdraw&! at a safe time
In the future. Dec·~mber, 1970, Is probably
not sate. November of 1972 ought to be sate_.

Octo bet
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soon. we hope he will redefine what is still
at stake for us in VIetnam. We hope he will
ol1er ::. generous vision of a long-term peacetime American lnlerest in the development
of Southeast Asia and friendship for all Its
peoples. (What Bil Irony that we should be
on fairly good terms with Communist Rus'la. talk!ng cautiously about a possible thaw
In relations wllh Communist China, and st!ll
so bl tterly embroiled with one of the smallest
Communist states.)
It will take even more steadiness than the
American people have already shown If they
are to persist through this winding-down
phase of the war and bear further casualties
and costs for modest objecllves. In this difficult undertaking, the President deserves our
sympathy and support, and the country deserves vis! ble, candid and con vlncing leadership.

PROTECTIVE REACTION IN
VIETNAM
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, there
seems to be some difficnJty interpreting
what Secretaries Laird and Rogers have
sa.l.d about the new mi1itary strategy of
"protective reaction" ordered last JnJy
and put into effect last August. In my
opinion, this is a decided shift away
from the old "search and destroy" and
"maximum pressure" tactics which were
employed in the last administration and
in the first months of the present administration. To me, the change means we
have moved a long distance in the direction of a "cease-fire and stand fast"
policy. It is my understanding of the new
strategy of "protective reaction" that
U.S. forces will fire only when a threat
that they will be fired on is developing
and that they remain prepared at all
times to take whatever action may be
necessary to repel any attack which
shonJd be in the offing.
It has been charged that this approach
wonJd expose U.S. forces to increased
casualties and wonJd hand an iniltiative
to enemy forces. It wonJd be my belief
t hat the opposite is the result; that
casualties wonJd be decreased as, in faot,
they have been reduced since the new
strategy has been in effect. As far as the
initiative is concerned, U.S. forces remain
on guard at all times and take whatever
actions are necessary to forestall any
attack which might be in the offing bUJt
fire only when there is a threat that they
will be fired on.
This interpretation of "protective reaction" would appear to be consistent
with what a military spokesman in
Washington has said:
Our defense a.ctlv1ties Include allied reconnaissance in force, sweeps and extensive
small patrol operations designed to keep the
enemy off-balance and to prevent enemy
at/tacks.

Or, even more specifically, what another military officer at the Pentagon is
quoted as saying:
We're not terribly far from such e. condition today (a "de facto cease-fire"). The
enemy has pulled back to sanctue.rtee
throughout VIetnam. Inflltratlon is way
down. We're sendlng out lots ot small patrols but we're no longer crashing through
the bush with large units spoiling for a
fight. Our concentration is on pacification
and on helping the Vletnamese take over
more or the war. Our ca.sulatles keep fallIng, week by week.

S 1:W€'7

This is certainly a far cry from the taking to control and decrcllt;e lhe IC\'Pl or
tactics of "maximum pressure" and lhe war. l t seems clear lhnt lhe Anwnc.,n
people not only endorse lhese men"trcs but
"search and destroy" and to me is an are
urging the President to push on wi ch
indication that the President is moving e.dditione.i sleps. The 'lmple fact is lhnt it
toward a cease-fire and standfast polbecomes more and more dl!llcult lo jusclfy
icy.
conlinued ballle deaths, even when lhe
I commend the Secretary of Defense number of casualties has been greally r efor announcing the policy; the Secre- duced, nfler the major decision has been
tary of State for emphasizing It; and taken to begin withdrawing American lroop,.
we suggesl, was uppermost In the minds
the President for iniLiating this new and This,
or many at the Americans who took part
highly significant tactic.
lasl week in the moratorium demonstrations.
Mr. President. in the Washington Star
Mr. McGOVERN subsequently said.
of October 11, just a week or so ago, appeared an article by Mr. Orr Kelly. The Mr. President, I wish to associate myself
article has to do with a press confer- with the remarks of the distinguished
ence held by Brig Gell. John W. Barnes, majority leader w!th reference to his
former commander of the 173d Airborne statement that we are, in fact, moving
Brigade in South Vietnam's Binh Dinh into a cease-fire. The Senator from MonProvince. I believe t.his WM the general tana (Mr. MANSFIELD) has been advocatreferred to on Thursday, 2 weeks ago ing that position for several years, both
tomorrow. at Secretary Laird's press under the previous administration and
ijonference, ,.,..h-en he announced the new under this administration. I hope that is
the direction in which we are moving.
"protective reaction' policy.
General Barnes until recently was in
command of one of the most heavily
STATESMANSHIP BY SENATOR
Communist-infested areas in the counMANSFIELD
try. He told newsmen he gave his 7,000
Mr.
SCOTT.
Mr. President, I ask
troopers strict orders on their pacification experiment begun on April 15. Gen- unanimous consent to have printed in
eral Barnes' 7,000 troopers were ordered the RECORD an editorial entitled "Statesto fire only at uniformed enemy soldiers, manship by Senator MANSFIELD," which
or men who were clearly not friendly was published in the Philadelphia I n forces and persons engaged in hostile acts quirer this morning. The editorial is very
praiseworthy of the positions taken by
such as throwing a hand grenade.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- the distinguished majority leader and
sent to have printed in the RECORD an the Senator from Arkansas <Mr. FuLeditorial entitled "Toward a Cease-Fire," BRIGHT). While I have not cleared this
which was published in the Baltimore matter with the majority leader, I wonJd
like to have it printed in the RECORD at
Sun of October 21, 1969.
There being no objection, the editorial this point.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. In light
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
of the Senator's statement, the Chair is
as follows:
quite certain the majority leader would
TOWARD A CEASE-FIRE
impose no objection. Without objection,
Reports from Washington that President
Nixon Is considering a proposal for a cease- it is so ordered.
The editorial, ordered to be printed in
fire In Vietnam are encouraging. as an indication of e. continuing search for ways to the RECORD, is as follows:
scale down the scope and Intensity of the
war. The American efforts In this directionsteps which Include the cessation of the
bombing In North VIetnam and revision of
the "search and destroy" tactics--have undoubtedly been major factors In the general
reduction in the so-called level of violence
and, more Important, In the decrease In battle c'lSualties. A cease-fire propose.! could
prope ~ly be made In line with these steps
and in llne with the measures being taken
to withdraw substantial numbers of American soldiers from South Vlelnam.
A proposal of this nature, first of all, would
underscore the United States pollc], and
hope, o! bringing lhe war to an end s soon
as possible. A standsllll cease-fire, In which
all troops would remain In place wilh combat operations suspended. could possibly
open the door to the negotiations for a political settlement which tbe United States
bas been seeking. with little or no response,
so far as the record shows, from North Vietnam.
But even if serious peace negotiations did
not develop, an American Initiative toward
e. cease-fire could point to e.nolher way In
which the war may be ended; that is, by
a steady dwindling of fighting until an undeclared and Ulmegotlated peace Is established. For several years now, some authorities have thought that the war may well
be brought to an end In this manner, rather
than through an openly negotiated settlement.
Mr. Nixon has strong support In this country now, we believe, for the measures he Is

STATEMANSHIP BY SENATOa MANSFIELD

As Democratic Majority Leader In the Senate, and a long- time advocate of peace In
Vietnam, Mike Mansfield took the Sennle
fioor to deliver a statesmanlike address that
ought to be a keynote for Americans, whatever their party, who genuinely seek an end
to the war.
Noting that the Nixon Administration Is
pursuing a new policy In Vietnam, dedicnled
to de-escalating the fighting and reducing
casualties and bringing U .S. troops home, lhe
fen:\tor from Montana declared: "I would
like to see lhe people of this nation get behind President Nixon . . . . I want to say as
a Democrat lhat It will be my intention lo
support lhe President." He went on to express his belief that slrong public support
for 11.1r. Nixon at this critical juncture In
peace errorls would expedile a "respons!IJie
settlement" In VIetnam.
There is great wisdom as well a.<; high
stat-esmanship in Senator Mansfield's re marks. At lhls time, of all limes, .rith tile
President of the United Stales lnilialing bold
str>ps townrd a reduction of the flgh t.ing
Wllile engaging In delicate diplomatic maneuvers lo has len a selllement. 1he Arneric~n
people should sland united. rather than divided, and should demonslrn.te support. instead of protest. for lhe U .S. pence o!Ten>;i vo
that Is already uncler way and Is being
acceieraled.
Chairman J. W. Fulbright o! the Senate
Foreign Relallons Committee, one of lhe
mosl outspoken war crlllcs, has acted sensibly in following Senator Mansfield's lead by
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postponing committee hearings on VIetnam
that had been scht.duled to begin next week.
They wm be del:~yed at lee.st until after
President Nixon's addresa to the nation on
November 3, when he IB to discuss the VIetnam situation.
There are, of course, some people In this
country who claim to be for peace but really
seek a Communist victory. It can be expected
that they will continue to fan the Hames ot
dissension wherever they ce.n. Other Americans. those who want to act responsibly In
the cause of peace, ought to rally to the call
of Senator Mansfield.

Octobe1· 22, 1969

